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Researchers have identified the use of social influence in phishing emails and have found 
greater cognitive impulsivity to predict phishing susceptibility. These findings suggest that 
relying on predominantly heuristic (rather than systematic) information processing strategies 
when managing emails could be a key contributor to users’ susceptibility. Accordingly, it is 
proposed that the effects of systematic processing on phishing susceptibility should be 
investigated. Specifically, research should determine whether manipulating systematic 
processing affects users’ judgements of the legitimacy of phishing and genuine emails. The 
outcomes of this research would have potential implications for cyber security training.




Organisations suffer both direct and indirect costs associated with cyber security 
incidents. Between 2014 and 2015, Australian organisations experienced the second highest 
financial loss worldwide at $3.27 million (PricewaterhouseCoopers [PWC] Australia, 2015). 
Other costs indicated by Australian organisations include loss of intellectual property, 
reputational loss, corrupted data, productivity loss, distrust from customers or partners, loss 
of customers, lawsuits and psychological stress to employees (Telstra Corporation, 2017).  
Despite the implementation of technical safeguards to defend against cyber-attacks, 
an organisation’s information security systems can be compromised by a single click in 
response to a phishing email. Cyber criminals not only see the organisation as a single entity 
with safeguards to overcome, but also as collections of individuals with psychological 
vulnerabilities to exploit (International Business Machines Corporation [IBM] Global 
Technology Services, 2014, 2014). As a form of social engineering, phishing emails use 
deception to exploit these psychological vulnerabilities (Muscanell, Guadagno, & Murphy, 
2014). Phishers typically use the identities of well-known and trusted companies. 
Subsequently, email users are deceived into clicking on an embedded link or opening an 
email attachment before providing the phisher with confidential information (e.g., passwords) 
or access to computer systems through the inadvertent installation of malware (Butavicius, 
Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015). Thus, by targeting the user, phishing emails can 
successfully compromise organisations’ information security systems. Consistent with this, 
human error has been reported as a factor in 95 percent of cyber security incidents, wherein 
clicking on an infected attachment or unsafe URL was the most prevalent contributing human 
factor (IBM Global Technology Services, 2014). In 2016, approximately one third of 
Australian organisations experienced phishing attacks on a weekly or monthly basis, making 
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them the most frequently occurring cyber security incident affecting Australian organisations 
(Telstra Corporation, 2017). 
While technical safeguards are often implemented to defend against the threat of 
phishing (Purkait, 2012), these are not guaranteed solutions. For instance, although email 
filters can be successful in preventing phishing attacks from reaching the user’s inbox, these 
filters rely on updates in the wake of new attacks to maintain their effectiveness. Hence, there 
is a window of vulnerability in the time between when new attacks are instigated and email 
filters are updated to defend against them. This is especially concerning given that 255,065 
unique phishing attacks worldwide were recorded in the year 2016 alone (Anti-Phishing 
Working Group [APWG], 2017). Exposure to phishing attacks therefore remains a possibility 
for almost all email users. For this reason, it is vitally important to recognise and understand 
the human element of susceptibility to phishing. In other words, researchers must seek to 
understand why users fall victim to phishing attacks and, in turn, how to reduce the phishing 
susceptibility of users and their organisations. 
Methodologies for Studying Phishing Susceptibility  
The methodologies used by phishing researchers can generally be categorised as 
either ‘real phishing’, phishing ‘IQ test’ or ‘scenario-based’(also known as ‘role-play’), and 
all three have both advantages and disadvantages for the study of phishing susceptibility. In 
real phishing studies, simulated phishing attacks are sent directly to participants’ normal 
email inboxes, and participants are not aware that their responses (or lack of responses) to 
these simulations are recorded by researchers. These studies provide a useful indication of the 
real-world response rates of members of specific institutions (e.g., students of a university, 
employees of an organisation) for phishing emails that can be either generic or targeted to 
members of that institution (Goel, Williams, & Dincelli, 2017; Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, 
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& Menczer, 2007; Ferguson, 2005; Rocha Flores, Holm, Nohlberg, & Ekstedt, 2015). They 
can also provide the opportunity to educate participants who respond to the simulated attacks. 
On the other hand, real phishing studies have been criticised for a number of ethical 
issues, including lack of informed consent for research participants, deception and the risk of 
negative reactions by participants (Finn & Jakobsson, 2007; Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & 
Menczer, 2007). Another issue specific to conducting real phishing studies in organisations is 
the risk of creating a negative security culture in which employees may perceive themselves 
to be under an undue level of scrutiny and may fear punishment as a consequence of being 
‘tricked’ by their own employers. Real phishing studies are also limited in what they can tell 
researchers about user susceptibility because they do not observe participants’ responses to 
genuine emails. They can observe correct phishing judgements for phishing emails, but not 
incorrect phishing judgements for genuine emails. This prevents real phishing studies from 
being able to examine users’ ability to discriminate between the two email types. 
Unlike the real phishing methodology, studies using the phishing IQ test or scenario-
based methodologies require participants’ informed consent and observe participants’ 
responses to both phishing and genuine emails (Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & 
Jerram, 2013). In this way, phishing researchers can apply the performance measurement 
approach known as Signal Detection Theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966). This approach can 
be applied to any circumstance where two possible stimulus types must be discriminated 
from one another (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). SDT provides two performance measures. In 
the context of phishing, discrimination measures how well individuals can distinguish 
between genuine and phishing emails, and bias measures the overall tendency to judge emails 
as either ‘genuine’ or ‘phishing’. This approach reconceptualises the problem of phishing 
susceptibility as one of decision-making under uncertainty. Users make ‘phishing’ or 
‘genuine’ judgements not only for phishing emails, but genuine emails as well. The SDT 
THINK BEFORE YOU CLICK 
6 
 
approach acknowledges that users make these judgements, correctly or incorrectly, for both 
email types. Therefore, phishing studies that do not accommodate the SDT approach are only 
capable of telling half of the story.  
Despite their similarities, there is an important difference between the phishing IQ test 
and scenario-based methodologies. Unlike scenario-based studies, participants of phishing IQ 
test studies are aware that their ability to detect phishing emails is being measured. 
Accordingly, these participants are primed for signs of phishing and have been shown to 
exhibit the subject expectancy effect (Anandpara, Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu, & Roinestad, 
2007; Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2013). In particular, Anandpara, 
Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu, and Roinestad (2007) found evidence to suggest that these 
participants are more are more biased towards making ‘phishing’ judgements. This was 
speculated to be because they are more suspicious of the legitimacy of emails compared to 
everyday email use. Conversely, researchers who use the scenario-based methodology 
incorporate a role play paradigm into their studies. Participants are not informed they are 
participating in a phishing study. Rather, they are instructed to assume the role of a fictitious 
person and to make judgements on emails received by that person. 
Parsons McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, and Jerram (2013) conducted a phishing 
study to validate the use of scenarios as a method for overcoming the subject expectancy 
effect. All participants were aware that they were participating in a study about email 
management, but only half were informed that they were participating in a study specifically 
about phishing. Rather than resulting in a bias towards ‘phishing’ judgements as indicated by 
Anandpara et al. (2007), priming participants with the notion of phishing was found to 
improve their ability to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. The authors 
speculated that these participants engaged in more diligent decision-making, and this is 
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supported by the finding that they took significantly longer to complete the experiment than 
participants who were not primed for signs of phishing.  
While the phishing IQ test methodology can be a more direct way to conduct early 
evaluations of interventions (Robila & Ragucci, 2006) and investigate the cues relied upon by 
users to detect phishing (Furnell, 2007), the findings of these studies cannot be generalised to 
actual user behaviour because of the subject expectancy effect. The phishing IQ test 
methodology is therefore criticised for its lack of real-world validity. For this reason, many 
researchers prefer the scenario-based methodology, as it enables phishing susceptibility to be 
studied in a manner that is still relatively high in real-word validity. Nevertheless, the 
scenario-based methodology still suffers from a number of limitations. These limitations stem 
from the challenge of eliciting meaningful responses without alerting participants to the true 
purpose of the study. For example, researchers must try to ensure that the inexplicit response 
options provided can be meaningfully encoded as judgements of phishing or genuine (e.g., 
Parsons et al. (2013) used response options such as ‘delete the email’). In order to prevent 
participants from responding according to judgements of relevance rather than legitimacy, 
participants can be instructed to assume that the emails are relevant to the fictitious person. 
Given the different advantages and disadvantages of the three phishing study 
methodologies, researchers must carefully consider which methodology is most appropriate 
for their research aims and attempt to minimise its disadvantages as much as possible.  
Cues Relied Upon by Users 
Phishers typically use company identities when constructing phishing emails, and are 
capable of fabricating a visual presentation that corresponds with this identity (e.g., logo, 
design). The intended effect is for the user’s trust in this company to be instilled in the email 
itself, so that the user does not question its legitimacy. Consistent with this, research has 
shown that users’ susceptibility is influenced by an inherent trust in the company that appears 
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to be the email sender (Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2008; Parsons et al., 2015). Furthermore, a 
range of studies (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobssen, & Menczer, 2007; Karakasiliotis, Furnell, & 
Papadaki, 2006; Parsons et al., 2015) have indicated that many users underestimate the extent 
to which email components can be manipulated by a phisher to appear legitimate. 
Parsons et al. (2015) developed a comprehensive list of cues that have been identified 
as important (either by users or researchers) for discriminating between phishing and genuine 
emails and websites. An analysis of expert ratings on the presence of each cue in a set of 50 
emails (half genuine, half phishing) resulted in the identification of five effective cues for 
discrimination; genuine emails were more likely to contain a legitimate URL (shown when 
the cursor is hovered over an embedded link), a sender’s address that appeared legitimate, 
message consistency and personalisation, whereas phishing emails were more likely to 
contain spelling and grammatical errors. A further analysis of the relationship between the 
presence of each cue and participants’ legitimacy judgements indicated that the only effective 
cues influencing these judgements were personalisation and spelling and grammatical errors. 
Participants were also influenced by five ineffective cues; visual presentation, copyright 
information or legal disclaimers, importance, urgency and positive consequences. Although a 
limitation of the study is that it cannot be determined how the cues interacted with one 
another to inform legitimacy judgements, it nevertheless provides insight into why some 
users are deceived by phishing emails. Other researchers have reported that even when users 
do attend to the URL as an effective cue, they do not always correctly judge its legitimacy 
(Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2008).  
It is important to note that the effective cues for discrimination and those cues relied 
upon by users may change over time (Parsons et al., 2015). In particular, phishers are already 
capable of spoofing (i.e., forging) the sender’s address of an email so that, for example, a 
phishing email using the identity of PayPal can appear to have been sent from the address 
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‘services@paypal.com’ (Furnell, 2007). Hence, it is possible for enough phishers to begin 
spoofing the sender’s address so that its appearance of legitimacy is no longer an effective 
cue. This is in addition to the increasingly common practice of spear-phishing, where 
phishers research their victims and personalise the email in order to increase the likelihood of 
responding. Currently, the only infallible cue for discrimination is the legitimacy of the URL. 
Even so, phishers can create an illegitimate URL that has the resemblance of a legitimate one 
(e.g., “www.paypa1.com/au/signin”, where the number “1” is substituted for the letter “l”).  
Social Influence in Phishing 
Many of the phishing cues mentioned above allude to a specific type of social 
engineering utilised by phishers. Social influence refers to overt forces occurring in our 
interactions with others that have the power to cause a change in our attitudes or behaviours 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Muscanell, Guadagno, & Murphy, 2014). In the context of face-
to-face interactions, Cialdini (2009) established six social influence techniques that serve as 
heuristics for decision-making: authority, scarcity, consistency, reciprocation, liking and 
social proof. When exploited by social engineers, these techniques are experienced as 
external social pressure to agree or comply with a request. In this way, social influence is 
used to persuade individuals and gain their compliance. Notably, social influence attempts are 
increasingly occurring in online contexts, and researchers have identified the use of all six 
social influence techniques by phishers (Akbar, 2014; Ferreira & Lenzini, 2015). Table 1 
provides a description of the six social influence techniques and examples from phishing 
research.  
The effectiveness of a given social influence technique can vary depending on the 
communication modality (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983), and phishing emails differ from face-to-
face persuasion contexts in important ways. 
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Technique Descriptiona Examples from Phishing Research 
Authority We are inclined to obey people in 
positions of authority. 
Copyright information and/or legal disclaimers (Parsons et al., 2015) 
Authoritative language (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015)  
The sender is a person or institution of authority (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & 
McCormac, 2015; Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014) 
Scarcity Opportunities seem more valuable to us 
when their availability is limited. 
Urgent language (Parsons et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2012) 
Reference to an offer that is limited by a deadline and/or a restricted number of 
participants (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Wright, 
Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014) 
Consistency We desire to be (and to appear) 
consistent with our previous actions 
and commitments. 
Reference to a user’s action(s) and/or commitment(s) (Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, 
Dinger, & Marett, 2014) 
Reciprocation We try to repay, in kind, what another 
person has provided us. 
Reference to action(s) by the sender (Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 
2014) 
Liking We prefer to say yes to those we know 
and like. 
Using the identity of a well-known and trusted company as the sender (Parsons et 
al., 2015) 
Humour (Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014) 
Social Proof We are more likely to perform the 
actions that we see others 
performing 
Reference to figures indicating a large number of people have already responded 
(Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Wright, Jensen, 
Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014) 
 
Table 1  
Cialdini’s (2009) social influence techniques and examples from phishing research. 
aCialdini (2009) 
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Phishing emails are usually non-interactive, meaning the social engineer has only a single 
opportunity per phishing email to persuade the user to respond (Hong, 2012). Additionally, 
the use of a text-based mediated channel may undermine the phisher’s persuasion attempt by 
enabling the user to re-read, and hence reprocess the message, which has been shown to 
facilitate the discovery of deception (George, Carlson, & Valacich, 2013). 
Accordingly, researchers have investigated whether some techniques are more 
persuasive in phishing emails than others (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 
2015; Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014). Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, 
and Marett (2014) found that liking had the largest positive effect on likelihood to respond, 
followed by scarcity, social proof and reciprocity, whereas consistency was ineffective and 
authority had an unexpected negative effect. Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, and McCormac 
(2015) investigated the persuasiveness of authority, scarcity and social proof. In contrast to 
Wright et al., authority was found to be the most effective social influence technique. 
Unexpectedly, the absence of social influence in a phishing email was found to be more 
effective than any of the techniques examined. Both Wright et al. and Butavicius et al. 
speculated that their unexpected results could be attributed to users’ increasing familiarity 
with social influence attempts in generic phishing emails, and hence their development of 
resistance to such attempts. 
Heuristics and Information Processing 
Research has found that higher levels of cognitive impulsivity may increase users’ 
susceptibility to phishing (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Parsons, 
McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2013; Welk et al., 2015). This finding is 
relevant to the use of social influence by phishers because cognitive impulsivity can affect 
how a persuasive message is processed by the receiver. Cognitive impulsivity refers to a 
person’s tendency to make decisions with little or no conscious thought. People who have 
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low levels of cognitive impulsivity are more likely to monitor and correct their cognitive 
impulses (Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 2016). Although two other phishing 
studies measured cognitive impulsivity and did not find this relationship, this is likely 
because Kumaraguru et al. (2007) incorporated only three phishing emails and a small 
participant sample, and Mayhorn and Nyeste (2012) provided feedback to participants on 
their ability to detect phishing during a training intervention. 
All of these studies except for Welk et al. (2015) used the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) to measure cognitive impulsivity. The CRT is a set of three 
problems, each designed to have an immediately intuitive but incorrect response. This 
response must be suppressed and overridden by more careful analytic reasoning in order to 
yield the correct answer. For example, the following is the first problem: “A bat and a ball 
together cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” 
(Frederick, 2005, p. 27). Initially, there is a strong tendency for respondents to consider the 
answer of “10 cents”, even by those who then use analytic reasoning to give the correct 
answer of “5 cents”. Butavicius et al. (2015) suggested that the reason cognitive impulsivity, 
and the CRT in particular, is associated with phishing susceptibility is that it may indicate 
whether users tend to rely on heuristic cues to make judgements of email legitimacy. Social 
influence takes advantage of our tendency to rely on heuristic cues. Each technique has the 
“ability to produce a distinct kind of automatic, mindless compliance from people, that is, a 
willingness to say yes without thinking first” (Cialdini, 2009, p. xiv). In this way, Butavicius 
et al. refer to dual-system information processing models as one explanation for why some 
people are persuaded to respond to phishing emails. 
Dual-system information processing models have been proposed to account for how 
individuals process persuasive messages, including the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chen & Chaiken, 
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1999). According to both models, individuals rely on two separate strategies for processing 
persuasive messages; whereas heuristic processing is automatic, quick, effortless and 
intuitive, systematic processing is controlled, slow, effortful and analytic. While systematic 
processing generally yields better-quality judgement, heuristic processing is more economic 
given our limited cognitive resources and the immense volume of information that we must 
continually process. For this reason, heuristic processing is understood to be the default 
strategy for processing information. Nevertheless, the judgements formed on the basis of 
heuristic processing can be overridden by systematic processing.  
When heuristic processing is used, only the superficially persuasive, i.e., heuristic, 
cues of a persuasive message inform judgement, such as the likeability of the message’s 
source. This means that social influence is likely to be more effective for gaining compliance 
when the message is processed heuristically (Kaptein, Markopoulos, de Ruyter, & Aarts, 
2015). Conversely, when systematic processing is used, judgement becomes informed by 
evidentiary cues, such as the reliability of the message’s source. Hence, activating systematic 
processing over and above heuristic processing may be an effective strategy for resisting 
social influence attempts (including those occurring in phishing emails), as it changes the 
way the persuasive message is processed and potentially the individual’s response (Sagarin & 
Cialdini, 2004). Thus, the use of systematic processing may reduce susceptibility to phishing. 
In addition, research has indicated that individuals routinely rely on heuristic cues 
when processing information online (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2005; Guadagno, Muscanell, 
Rice, & Roberts, 2013; Metzger, Flanagin, & Medders, 2010). Muscanell, Guadagno, and 
Murphy (2014) argue this is because the online context imposes a high cognitive load on 
users; not only do users have access to a vast amount of information, they often multitask, 
making them more prone to relying on heuristic processing as a way of conserving cognitive 
resources. Similarly, Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, and Rao (2011) argue that users 
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eventually learn to manage this high cognitive load by developing heuristic, habitual response 
patterns. This in turn is argued to make individuals more likely to inattentively respond to 
emails, and hence more susceptible to phishing. This was supported by research that found 
greater heuristic processing and email habit strength significantly increases phishing 
susceptibility, whereas greater systematic processing significantly reduces it (Vishwanath, 
2015; Vishwanath, Harrison, & Ng, 2016). 
Wang, Herath, Chen, Vishwanath, and Rao (2012) did not find that expending greater 
cognitive effort (i.e., systematic processing) whilst processing a phishing email reduced the 
likelihood of responding. However, Wang et al. used a single email that incorporated several 
effective indicators of phishing, including multiple grammatical errors and an illegitimate 
sender’s address (Parsons et al., 2015). While grammatical errors are an important 
illegitimacy cue relied upon by users, many phishing emails do not contain these errors and, 
as mentioned previously, many contain a spoofed sender’s address. The high availability of 
phishing cues may have meant that participants did not expend a great deal of cognitive effort 
to reach a phishing decision. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of 
manipulating systematic processing on users’ legitimacy judgements for both phishing and 
genuine emails where multiple, fallible cues are not present. Nevertheless, Wang et al.’s 
finding that attention to a social influence technique increased the likelihood to respond 
provides further evidence to support dual-system information processing as an explanation of 
phishing susceptibility.  
Phishing researchers have tended to prefer the HSM to account for the relationship 
between information processing strategy and phishing susceptibility (Goel, Williams, and 
Dincelli, 2017; Luo, Zhang, Burd, & Seazzu, 2013; Vishwanath, 2015). The HSM 
incorporates the concept of the sufficiency threshold; the level of confidence an individual 
desires to reach before they will consider their judgement to be ‘good enough’ and so 
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discontinue processing of the message. The extent of information processing required to 
reach the sufficiency threshold determines whether systematic processing will be activated 
over and above initial heuristic processing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999).  
Luo, Zhang, Burd, and Seazzu (2013) suggested that the success of a phishing attack 
depends on whether the phisher’s message can either increase the recipients’ reliance on 
heuristic processing (through embedding heuristic cues), lower the sufficiency threshold to 
prevent the activation of systematic processing, or else withstand the scrutiny of at least 
minimal systematic processing. Similarly, Goel, Williams, and Dincelli (2017) suggested that 
contextualising an email message so that it is more likely to be perceived by the user as 
personally relevant (e.g., spear-phishing), works to lower the sufficiency threshold (thus 
preventing systematic processing activation) and also to help the email to withstand scrutiny 
should heuristic processing give way to more systematic processing. 
In summary, evidence from phishing research supports dual-system information 
processing as an explanation for why some users respond to phishing emails. This has 
important implications. It suggests that increasing users’ reliance on systematic processing 
when managing emails could reduce their susceptibility to phishing. A review of the literature 
determined that the experimental effects of manipulating users’ information processing 
strategy (i.e., heuristic vs. systematic processing) on their judgements of the legitimacy of 
phishing and genuine emails is yet to be investigated. 
Manipulations of Information Processing Strategy 
Research has shown that individuals’ information processing strategy can be 
manipulated, at least in the short term. The only study identified to have manipulated 
information processing strategy in the context of emails was conducted by Yan and Gozu 
(2012). In a repeated measures design, participants were instructed to read the email content 
of 36 spam emails either ‘quickly and casually’ (heuristic processing strategy) or ‘slowly and 
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carefully’ (systematic processing strategy). Participants’ decisions were recorded as correct 
only if they decided to delete the spam email rather than open or respond to it. It was found 
that participants were more likely to delete the emails when relying on systematic processing. 
While the results are consistent with a dual-system information processing explanation for 
phishing susceptibility, the study did not examine the manipulation effects on genuine emails. 
Therefore, it could not determine whether the information processing manipulation merely 
produced a greater bias towards illegitimacy judgements for both spam and genuine emails, 
rather than an improved ability to discriminate between the two email types. This prevented 
the study from providing a comprehensive examination of the manipulation effects. Also, the 
study did not incorporate a role-play to encourage responses that reflect judgements of 
legitimacy rather than personal relevance. 
Several authors have experimented with the effects of information processing 
manipulations outside of the email context. The CRT is commonly used as an outcome 
variable to demonstrate these effects. Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre (2007) found that 
when the CRT is presented in a difficult-to-read font rather than an easy-to-read font, 
individuals assume that greater cognitive effort is required to complete the task and are 
subsequently more likely to provide correct responses (consistent with a systematic 
processing strategy). Attridge and Inglis (2015) examined the effects of completing one or 
more problems from the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM; Raven, Raven, & 
Court, 1998). Respondents are presented with an incomplete matrix of visual designs, and 
they are asked to identify the missing design that completes the pattern from the response 
options provided. Merely completing a single RAPM problem was found to significantly 
improve participants’ CRT performance. Hauser and Schwarz (2015) investigated the effects 
of an instructional manipulation check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). 
Instructional manipulation checks present a lure question (e.g., “Which of these activities do 
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you engage in regularly? (click on all that apply).”) with a smaller block of text that instructs 
respondents to ignore the lure responses (e.g., “running”) and instead click “other” and enter 
“I read the instructions” in the corresponding text box. Participants who followed the 
instructional manipulation check instructions subsequently scored higher on the CRT. 
In addition to being an outcome variable, the CRT itself has been used as an 
information processing manipulation. Pinillos, Smith, Nair, Marchetto, and Mun (2011) 
found that answering one or more of the three CRT problems correctly subsequently 
produced a pattern of philosophical judgements that had greater similarity to those of 
philosophers. The authors argued that systematic processing activation was the effect of 
experiencing the realisation that one’s first response was incorrect, hence prompting more 
careful reasoning.  
These findings support the possibility that users’ information processing strategy can 
be manipulated in a way that might affect their judgements of emails. The effects of such a 
manipulation could be similar to the findings observed by Parsons et al. (2013), where 
priming participants with the notion of phishing was found to improve their ability to 
discriminate between genuine emails and phishing attacks. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Exposure to phishing attacks is a possibility for almost all email users. It is thus 
important to recognise the human element of phishing susceptibility and seek to understand 
why users fall victim to phishing emails. Researchers have identified the use of social 
influence in phishing emails and have found greater cognitive impulsivity to predict phishing 
susceptibility. These findings suggest that a reliance on predominantly heuristic (rather than 
systematic) information processing strategies when managing emails could be a key 
contributor to users’ susceptibility. Research has shown that individuals’ information 
processing strategy can be manipulated, at least in the short term, including in the context of 
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emails (Yan & Gozu, 2012). However, the experimental effects of manipulating users’ 
information processing strategy on their judgements of emails is yet to be investigated. 
Of the three main methodologies used in phishing research, the scenario-based 
methodology would be the most appropriate for this investigation, because responses to both 
phishing and genuine emails, assumed to be relevant to the recipient, can be observed.  
If it is the case that systematic processing activation reduces phishing susceptibility, 
then this result would have two important implications. First, it would provide stronger 
evidence for dual-system information processing as an explanation for why some users 
respond to phishing attacks. Second, it would provide a new focus for user training against 
these attacks. Rather than merely warning users about the threat posed by phishing or even 
providing instructions for recognising the attacks, users could be trained to activate 
systematic processing as an effective strategy for defending against the threat of phishing.  
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The present study investigated the effects of systematic processing on phishing susceptibility. 
A total of 1,037 participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions. Participants 
either completed one of three information processing manipulations (IPMs) or did not 
complete an IPM before responding to email stimuli. Participants’ scores on the IPMs were 
used as an indication of their information processing strategy (heuristic vs. systematic) when 
responding to email stimuli. Participants who completed an IPM and attained a high score 
were better able to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. Of the three IPMs, 
discrimination performance was only found to be improved by attaining higher scores on the 
Matrix Reasoning Task. The outcomes of this research have implications for cyber security 
training. Directions for future research on phishing susceptibility are discussed.  
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Despite the implementation of technical safeguards to defend against cyber-attacks, 
an organisation’s information security systems can be compromised by a single click in 
response to a phishing email. Cyber criminals not only see the organisation as a single entity 
with safeguards to overcome, but also as collections of individuals with psychological 
vulnerabilities to exploit (International Business Machines Corporation [IBM] Global 
Technology Services, 2014). As a form of social engineering, phishing emails use deception 
to exploit these psychological vulnerabilities (Muscanell, Guadagno, & Murphy, 2014). 
Phishers typically use the identities of well-known and trusted companies. Subsequently, 
email users are deceived into clicking on an embedded link or opening an email attachment 
before providing the phisher with confidential information (e.g., passwords) or access to 
computer systems through the inadvertent installation of malware (Butavicius, Parsons, 
Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015). Thus, by targeting the user, phishing emails can successfully 
compromise organisations’ information security systems. 
Phishing emails are the most prevalent cyber security incident affecting Australian 
organisations. In 2016, approximately one third of those surveyed experienced phishing 
attacks on a weekly or monthly basis (Telstra Corporation, 2017).While technical safeguards 
are often implemented to defend against the threat of phishing (Purkait, 2012), these are not 
guaranteed solutions. For instance, although email filters can be successful in preventing 
phishing attacks from reaching the user’s inbox, these filters rely on updates in the wake of 
new attacks to maintain their effectiveness. Hence, there is a window of vulnerability in the 
time between when new attacks are instigated and email filters are updated to defend against 
them. This is especially concerning given that 255,065 unique phishing attacks worldwide 
were recorded in the year 2016 alone (Anti-Phishing Working Group [APWG], 2017). 
Exposure to phishing attacks therefore remains a possibility for almost all email users. For 
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this reason, it is important to recognise and understand the human element of susceptibility to 
phishing. In other words, researchers must seek to understand why users fall victim to 
phishing attacks and, in turn, how to reduce the phishing susceptibility of users and their 
organisations.  
Accordingly, the present study aims to investigate users’ information processing 
strategy as a key contributor to their susceptibility. Specifically, it aims to determine whether 
manipulating systematic processing can affect their judgements of the legitimacy of phishing 
and genuine emails. The outcomes of this research have potential implications for cyber 
security training. 
 The Design of Phishing Studies 
The methodologies used by phishing researchers can generally be categorised as 
either ‘real phishing’, phishing ‘IQ test’ or ‘scenario-based’ (also known as ‘role-play’). In 
real phishing studies, simulated phishing attacks are carried out using participants’ normal 
email inboxes, and participants are not aware that their responses (or lack of responses) to 
these simulations  are recorded by researchers (Finn & Jakobsson, 2007). Although real-
phishing studies have high real-world face validity, they are limited in what they can tell 
researchers about user susceptibility. This is mainly because they do not observe participants’ 
responses to genuine emails (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015), i.e., they 
observe correct phishing judgements for phishing emails, but not incorrect phishing 
judgements for genuine emails. 
Unlike the real phishing methodology, studies using the phishing IQ test or scenario-
based methodologies observe participants’ responses to both genuine and phishing emails 
(Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2013). In this way, phishing 
researchers can apply the performance measurement approach known as Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966). This approach can be applied to any task that involves 
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discriminating between two possible stimulus types (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). SDT 
provides two performance measures. In the context of phishing, discrimination measures how 
well individuals can distinguish between genuine and phishing emails, and bias measures the 
overall tendency to judge emails as either genuine or phishing. This approach 
reconceptualises the problem of phishing susceptibility as one of decision-making under 
uncertainty. Users make ‘phishing’ or ‘genuine’ judgements not only for phishing emails, but 
genuine emails as well. The SDT approach acknowledges that users make these judgements, 
correctly or incorrectly, for both email types. Therefore, phishing studies that do not 
accommodate the SDT approach are only capable of telling half of the story.  
Despite their similarities, there is an important difference between the phishing IQ test 
and scenario-based methodologies. Unlike scenario-based studies, participants of phishing IQ 
test studies are aware that their ability to detect phishing emails is being measured. 
Accordingly, these participants are primed for signs of phishing and have been shown to 
exhibit the subject expectancy effect (Anandpara, Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu, & Roinestad, 
2007; Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2013). Parsons McCormac, 
Pattinson, Butavicius, and Jerram (2013) conducted a study to test the prediction by 
Anandpara, Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu, and Roinestad (2007) that participants exhibiting the 
subject expectancy effect are more biased towards making ‘phishing’ judgements. The 
prediction was based on the assertion that these participants are more suspicious of the 
legitimacy of emails compared to everyday email use. In contrast, priming participants with 
the notion of phishing was actually found to improve their ability to discriminate between 
genuine and phishing emails. Parsons et al. (2013) speculated that these participants engaged 
in more diligent decision-making, and this is supported by the finding that they took 
significantly longer to complete the experiment than participants who were not primed for 
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signs of phishing. Due to the subject expectancy effect, the findings of phishing IQ test 
studies cannot be generalised to actual user behaviour.  
Researchers who use the scenario-based methodology incorporate a role play into 
their study design. Participants are not informed they are participating in a phishing study. 
Rather, they are instructed to assume the role of a fictitious person and to make judgements 
on emails received by that person. Parsons et al. (2013) observed the subject expectancy 
effect in participants who were informed the study was about phishing, but not in participants 
who were informed the study was about email management. In this way, Parsons et al. (2013) 
validated the use of scenarios as a method for overcoming the subject expectancy effect. The 
scenario-based methodology was used in the present study. 
 User Susceptibility to Phishing 
Research has shown that phishers utilise social influence in their construction of 
phishing emails to persuade users to respond (Akbar, 2014). Social influence refers to overt 
forces occurring in our interactions with others that have the power to cause a change in our 
attitudes or behaviours (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Muscanell, Guadagno, & Murphy, 
2014). In the context of face-to-face interactions, Cialdini (2009) established six social 
influence techniques that serve as heuristics for decision-making: authority, scarcity, 
consistency, reciprocation, liking and social proof. When exploited by social engineers, these 
strategies are experienced as external social pressure to agree or comply with a request. In 
this way, social influence is used to persuade individuals and gain their compliance. Notably, 
social influence attempts are increasingly occurring in online contexts, and researchers have 
identified the use of all six social influence strategies by phishers (Akbar, 2014; Ferreira & 
Lenzini, 2015). 
Researchers have further investigated whether some techniques are more persuasive 
in phishing emails than others (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Wright, 
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Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014). Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, and Marett 
(2014) found that liking had the largest positive effect on likelihood to respond, followed by 
scarcity, social proof and reciprocation, whereas consistency was ineffective and authority 
had an unexpected negative effect. Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, and McCormac (2015) 
investigated the persuasiveness of authority, scarcity and social proof. In contrast to Wright et 
al., authority was found to be the most effective social influence technique. Unexpectedly, the 
absence of social influence in a phishing email was found to be more effective than any of the 
techniques examined. Both Wright et al. and Butavicius et al. speculated that their 
unexpected results could be attributed to users’ increasing familiarity with social influence 
attempts in generic phishing emails, and hence their development of resistance to such 
attempts. 
Research has found that higher levels of cognitive impulsivity may increase users’ 
susceptibility to phishing (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Parsons, 
McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2013; Welk et al., 2015). This finding is 
relevant to the use of social influence by phishers because cognitive impulsivity can affect 
how a persuasive message is processed by the receiver. Cognitive impulsivity refers to a 
person’s tendency to make decisions with little or no conscious thought. People who have 
low levels of cognitive impulsivity are more likely to monitor and correct their cognitive 
impulses (Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 2016). Although two phishing 
studies that measured cognitive impulsivity did not find this relationship with phishing 
susceptibility, this is perhaps because Kumaraguru et al. (2007) incorporated only three 
phishing emails and a small participant sample, and Mayhorn and Nyeste (2012) provided 
feedback to participants on their ability to detect phishing during a training intervention.  
All of these studies except for Welk et al. (2015) used the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) to measure cognitive impulsivity. The CRT is a set of three 
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problems, each designed to invoke an immediately intuitive but incorrect response. This 
intuitive response must be suppressed and overridden by more careful analytic reasoning in 
order to yield the correct answer. For example, the following is the first problem: “A bat and 
a ball together cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost?” (Frederick, 2005, p. 27). Initially, there is a strong tendency for respondents to 
consider the answer of “10 cents”, even by those who then use analytic reasoning to give the 
correct answer of “5 cents”. Butavicius et al. (2015) suggested that the reason cognitive 
impulsivity, and the CRT in particular, is associated with phishing susceptibility is that it may 
indicate whether users tend to rely on heuristic cues to make judgements of email legitimacy. 
Social influence takes advantage of our tendency to rely on heuristic cues. Each technique 
has the “ability to produce a distinct kind of automatic, mindless compliance from people, 
that is, a willingness to say yes without thinking first” (Cialdini, 2009, p. xiv). In this way, 
Butavicius et al. refer to dual-system information processing models as one explanation for 
why some people are persuaded to respond to phishing emails. 
 Heuristics and User Decision-making 
Dual-system information processing models have been proposed to account for how 
individuals process persuasive messages, including the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). According 
to these models, individuals rely on two separate strategies for processing persuasive 
messages; whereas heuristic processing is automatic, quick, effortless and intuitive, 
systematic processing is controlled, slow, effortful and analytic. While systematic processing 
generally yields better-quality judgements, heuristic processing is more economic given our 
limited cognitive resources and the immense volume of information that we must continually 
process. For this reason, heuristic processing is understood to be the default strategy for 
THINK BEFORE YOU CLICK 
35 
 
processing information. Nevertheless, the judgements formed on the basis of heuristic 
processing can be overridden by systematic processing.  
When heuristic processing is used, only the superficially persuasive, i.e., heuristic, 
cues inform a person’s judgement (e.g., likeability of the message’s source). This means that 
social influence is likely to be more effective when the message is processed heuristically 
(Kaptein, Markopoulos, de Ruyter, & Aarts, 2015). Conversely, when systematic processing 
is used, judgement becomes informed by evidentiary, i.e., systematic, cues (e.g., reliability of 
the message’s source). Hence, activating systematic processing over and above heuristic 
processing may be an effective strategy for resisting social influence attempts (including 
those occurring in phishing emails), as it changes the way the persuasive message is 
processed and potentially the individual’s response (Sagarin & Cialdini, 2004). Thus, the use 
of systematic processing may reduce susceptibility to phishing. 
In addition, research has indicated that individuals routinely rely on heuristic cues 
when processing information online (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2005; Guadagno, Muscanell, 
Rice, & Roberts, 2013; Metzger, Flanagin, & Medders, 2010). Muscanell, Guadagno, and 
Murphy (2014) argue this is because the online context imposes a high cognitive load on 
users; not only do users have access to a vast amount of information, they often multitask, 
making them more prone to relying on heuristic processing as a way of conserving cognitive 
resources. Similarly, Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, and Rao (2011) argue that users 
eventually learn to manage this high cognitive load by developing heuristic, habitual response 
patterns. This, in turn, is argued to make individuals more likely to inattentively respond to 
emails, and hence more susceptible to phishing. This was supported by research that found 
greater heuristic processing and email habit strength significantly increases phishing 
susceptibility, whereas greater systematic processing significantly reduces it (Vishwanath, 
2015; Vishwanath, Harrison, & Ng, 2016).  
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Wang, Herath, Chen, Vishwanath, and Rao (2012) did not find that expending greater 
cognitive effort (i.e., systematic processing) whilst processing a phishing email reduced the 
likelihood of responding. However, Wang et al. used a single email that incorporated several 
indicators of phishing, including multiple grammatical errors and an illegitimate sender’s 
address (Parsons et al., 2015). Parsons et al. (2015) showed that spelling and grammatical 
errors in particular is an important illegitimacy cue relied upon by users. However, many 
phishing emails do not contain these errors, and many additionally contain a ‘spoofed’ 
sender’s address (Furnell, 2007) so that, for example, a phishing email using the identity of 
PayPal can appear to have been sent from the address “services@paypal.com”. The high 
availability of phishing cues may have meant that participants did not expend a great deal of 
cognitive effort to reach a phishing decision. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate 
the effects of systematic processing on users’ legitimacy judgements for both phishing and 
genuine emails where multiple, fallible cues are not present. Nevertheless, Wang et al.’s 
finding that attention to a social influence technique increased the likelihood to respond 
provides further evidence to support dual-system information processing as an explanation of 
phishing susceptibility. 
In summary, evidence from phishing research supports dual-system information 
processing as an explanation for why some users respond to phishing emails. This has 
important implications. It suggests that increasing users’ reliance on systematic processing 
when managing emails could reduce their susceptibility to phishing. Our review of the 
literature determined that the experimental effects of manipulating users’ information 
processing strategy (i.e., heuristic vs. systematic processing) on their judgements of the 
legitimacy of phishing and genuine emails is yet to be investigated. 
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 Manipulations of Information Processing Strategy 
Research has shown that individuals’ information processing strategy can be 
manipulated, at least in the short term. The only study identified to have manipulated 
information processing strategy in the context of emails was conducted by Yan and Gozu 
(2012). In a repeated measures design, participants were instructed to read the email content 
of spam emails either ‘quickly and casually’ (heuristic processing strategy) or ‘slowly and 
carefully’ (systematic processing strategy). It was found that participants were more likely to 
delete the emails, rather than open or respond to them, when relying on systematic 
processing. While the results are consistent with a dual-system information processing 
explanation for phishing susceptibility, the study did not examine the manipulation effects on 
genuine emails. Therefore, it could not determine whether the information processing 
manipulation merely produced a greater bias towards ‘phishing’ judgements for both spam 
and genuine emails, rather than an improved ability to discriminate between the two email 
types.  
Several authors have experimented with information processing manipulations outside 
of the email context to examine the effects on various judgments. Attridge and Inglis (2015) 
examined the effects of completing one or more problems from the Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (RAPM; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). These problems are explicitly 
difficult tasks requiring the use of systematic processing (Attridge & Inglis, 2015). 
Respondents are presented with an incomplete matrix of visual designs, and they are asked to 
identify the missing design that completes the pattern from the response options provided. 
The authors found that merely completing a single RAPM problem significantly improved 
participants’ performance on the CRT.  
In addition to being an outcome variable, the CRT itself has been used as an 
information processing manipulation. Pinillos, Smith, Nair, Marchetto, and Mun (2011) 
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found that answering one or more of the three CRT problems correctly subsequently 
produced a pattern of philosophical judgements that had greater similarity to those of 
philosophers. The authors argued that increased systematic processing was the effect of 
experiencing the realisation that one’s first response was incorrect, hence prompting more 
careful reasoning.  
These findings support the possibility that users’ information processing strategy can 
be manipulated in a way that might affect their judgements of emails. The effects of such a 
manipulation could be similar to the findings observed by Parsons et al. (2013), where 
priming participants with the notion of phishing was found to improve their ability to 
discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. Research has found a significant 
relationship between phishing susceptibility and performance on the CRT (Butavicius, 
Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & 
Jerram, 2013), and Pinillos et al. (2011) demonstrated that the CRT is an effective 
information processing manipulation. Accordingly, it is important to investigate the effects of 
the CRT as an information processing manipulation on users’ email judgement.  
However, research has also identified a number of limitations associated with the 
CRT. First, male respondents tend to score higher than female respondents (Thomson & 
Oppenheimer, 2016). Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) argue that the difference between 
genders can be explained by the results of studies indicating that CRT performance shares a 
positive correlation with numerical reasoning ability (Weller et al., 2013; Welsh, Burns, & 
Delfabbro, 2013). This suggests that respondents can reject the heuristic answer but still 
answer incorrectly due to low numerical reasoning ability. Second, Thomson and 
Oppenheimer found evidence to suggest that the CRT suffers from over-exposure amongst 
research participants. This is in addition to the finding by Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 
THINK BEFORE YOU CLICK 
39 
 
(2014) that CRT performance shares a positive correlation with research participation 
experience. These findings potentially undermine the validity of the CRT. 
Consequently, Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) developed and validated the 
CRT-2. The CRT-2 is a set of four problems designed to provide an extension of, or an 
alternative to, the original CRT. It is found to share a weaker correlation with numerical 
reasoning ability, to have no gender differences and to elicit a higher proportion of 
systematic, rather than heuristic, responses than the CRT. Otherwise, the CRT-2 shares the 
same characteristics as the CRT. For these reasons, the effects of attaining a high CRT-2 
score on email judgement may be different to the effects of attaining a high score on the 
CRT.  
Like the CRT, matrix reasoning problems have also been shown to be an effective 
information processing manipulation (Attridge & Inglis, 2015). These problems are multiple 
choice and are not designed to have intuitive responses. Hence, the effects of attaining a high 
matrix reasoning task (MRT) score on email judgement may be different to the effects of 
attaining a high score on the CRT and CRT-2. A notable advantage of a MRT is that, unlike 
the CRT and CRT-2, it is easy to generate new problems that individuals have never been 
exposed to before. Another advantage is that an MRT is less culturally biased. Therefore, the 
present study also sought to investigate the effects of completing a Matrix Reasoning Task 
(MRT) on users’ judgements of the legitimacy of phishing and genuine emails.  
 The Present Study 
The present study used a scenario-based methodology to investigate the effects of 
systematic processing on phishing susceptibility. The study incorporated 14 images of emails, 
half of which were genuine and the other half phishing, created in a way that the only cue for 
legitimacy was the URL. Three different tasks were utilised to manipulate information 
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processing strategy: the CRT, CRT-2 and a MRT. The main aims of this study are 
summarised below: 
1. To determine the effect of systematic processing on users’ ability to 
discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. 
2. To determine the effect of systematic processing on users’ bias towards 
judging an email as either ‘phishing’ or ‘genuine’. 
3. To compare the CRT, CRT-2 and MRT as manipulations of information 
processing strategy in the context of email judgement. 
2. Method 
 Participants 
Participants were recruited between May and July 2017 using the Qualtrics online 
survey platform. They were required to be working adults (18 years or older) living in 
Australia and to spend at least some proportion of their time at work using a computer or 
portable device (e.g., laptop, tablet, smartphone). Participants received an incentive via 
Qualtrics to participate in the study. 
A total of 1,082 participants met the inclusion criteria and finished the survey with a 
completion time that did not indicate inattentive responding. An additional 45 participants 
were excluded from analysis based on inattentive responding (e.g., responding with the same 
response option for 90% or more of the items within a scale). This resulted in a total sample 
of 1,037 participants (551 males, 485 females and 1 gender unspecified). Participants were 
evenly distributed across age categories, with 18.6% of them aged between 18-29, 22.7% 
aged between 30-39, 20.6% aged between 40-49, 21.8% aged between 50-59 and 16.3% aged 
60 and over. 
 Materials 
 Email Stimuli.  
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The main study incorporated 14 images of emails, half of which were genuine emails 
and the other half phishing emails. These images were created by using actual genuine and 
phishing emails, either received by the authors or found online, as templates. 
The emails were created in a way that the only cue for legitimacy was the URL (i.e., 
all emails contained logos and a legitimate sender’s address, and they lacked personalisation 
and spelling and grammatical errors). The genuine emails contained URLs that were 
consistent with actual URLs of the claimed sender. The phishing emails contained actual 
phishing URLs, modified by a single character (see Appendix C for examples of the email 
stimuli). At the beginning of the Email Task, participants were advised that if they were to 
hover over a link (or hold their finger down on a link if on a mobile device), they would be 
shown where it would take them (i.e., the URL was displayed to the user).  
The 14 emails were described as having been taken from the inbox of ‘Alex Jones’, 
and participants were instructed to assume that all emails had been sent to Alex deliberately 
(i.e., “Alex has not received them by mistake”) and that the topics in the emails were relevant 
to Alex (i.e., “if the email mentions a piece of software, assume that Alex is interested in that 
software”). This role play methodology is intended to prevent participants from giving 
responses that reflect judgements of personal relevance rather than legitimacy. A range of 
email topics were utilised (see Table 1 for a description of each email). Participants were 
advised that the names and contact details in the emails were fictitious. 
 Information Processing Manipulations.  
Three different tasks were utilised as information processing manipulations (IPMs) 
(see Appendix D).  
 CRT.  
 
 




Email Topic Phishing Email Genuine Email 
Police matter Australian Federal Police National Crime Check 
Enter competition Coles Velocity Frequent Flyer 
Upgrade for an improved user 
experience 
Microsoft Outlook Dropbox 
Customer reward program voucher Amazon Prime Athlete’s Foot 
Donate to charity Australian Red Cross Ronald McDonald House 
Charity 
Customer satisfaction survey McDonald’s Virgin Mobile 
Reset password Apple LinkedIn 
 
Table 1  
Description of email stimuli. 
 
The three CRT items were presented on the same page, in a set order, and participants 
provided text responses. Responses were categorised as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ and 
participants received a score between 0 and 3. 
 CRT-2.  
The four CRT-2 items were presented on the same page, in a set order, and 
participants provided text responses. Responses were categorised as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ 
and participants received a score between 0 and 4. 
 MRT.  
Three matrix reasoning items were selected from the pool of items by the 
International Cognitive Ability Resource Team (ICAR, 2014). They are similar to RAPM 
items (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). The three items were presented on the same page, in a 
set order, and participants selected their responses from the six options provided. Responses 
were categorised as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ and participants received a score between 0 and 3. 
 
 Task Difficulty. 
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 Participants rated the difficulty of each IPM after its completion by responding to the 
item “Overall, how difficult do you think it was to solve those problems?” on a 5-point likert 
scale ranging from very easy to very difficult.  
 Email Judgement Measures. 
 Link Safety Rating.  
The 14 images of emails were presented separately in a random order, and 
participants were asked to respond to the statement “It is okay to click on the link in this 
email” on a 5-point likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 Discrimination and Bias. 
The SDT non-parametric measures of discrimination and bias (Stanislaw & Todorov, 
1999), represented as A’ and B” respectively, were calculated using participants responses to 
the Link Safety Rating items. A score of 1 for A’ means that discrimination performance is 
perfect, while a score of .5 means that phishing emails cannot be distinguished from genuine 
emails. B” scores range from -1 (phishing responses only) to 1 (genuine responses only), 
while a score of 0 indicates no response bias. 
 Procedure 
Ethics approval was granted by the Human Research Ethics Subcommittee of The 
University of Adelaide School of Psychology. The present study was part of a larger data 
collection project, and so does not report on all of the materials that were incorporated in the 
survey. 
Participants were invited to participate via email received from Qualtrics. They were 
informed the study as an investigation of how people use email and social media, and the 
factors that may affect how people use email and social media. Participants were required to 
confirm that they had read the Information Sheet and given their consent to participate in 
order to continue with the survey.  
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Participants first responded to inclusion criteria items and demographic items before 
completing a 13-item self-construal measure not analysed in the present study. This measure, 
together with the aforementioned items, acted as a buffer to ensure that the activities 
participants were engaged in just prior to beginning the survey did not have an effect on their 
information processing strategy during subsequent sections of the survey (Hauser & Schwarz, 
2015).  
Participants were then randomly allocated to one of four conditions, as depicted in 
Figure 1. Participants in the three experimental conditions completed an IPM (i.e., the CRT, 
CRT-2 or MRT). Only those participants in the Control condition did not complete an IPM 
prior to the Email Task. All participants completed the Email Task, followed by those IPMs 
that they had not completed earlier. This was to ensure the length of the study was consistent 
across conditions, and to determine that there were no differences in scores on the IPMs 
between participants assigned to separate conditions. Throughout the survey, participants 
rated the difficulty of each IPM immediately after its completion.




Figure 1. Experimental design with four conditions. 
 
3. Results 
 Information Processing Manipulation Characteristics 
Table 2 presents IPM descriptive statistics across the sample and by condition. A 
series of one-way between groups ANOVAs determined that there were no differences 
between the four conditions regarding performance on the CRT, F(3, 1033) = 0.45, p = .72, 
CRT-2, F(3, 1033) = 1.10, p = .35, and MRT, F(3, 1033) = 0.36, p = .78. 
An independent samples t-test indicated that male participants (M = 0.92, SD = 1.06) 
scored significantly higher on the CRT than female participants (M = 0.60, SD = 0.91), 
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  CRT CRT-2 MRT 
  Score (%) Task difficulty Score (%) Task difficulty Score (%) Task difficulty 
Condition n M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
CRT 253 25.82 33.74 2.66 1.18 40.32 31.97 2.41 1.10 48.22 32.57 3.44 1.10 
CRT-2 261 25.93 34.04 2.84 1.19 39.75 31.82 1.96 0.89 48.66 33.00 3.53 1.07 
MRT 265 27.30 34.53 2.80 1.22 43.77 32.91 2.34 1.08 48.43 32.67 3.45 1.09 
Control 258 23.90 31.97 2.78 1.25 39.15 31.78 2.32 1.13 45.99 33.71 3.45 1.12 
 
Table 2  
Information processing manipulation descriptive statistics. 
Note. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test; MRT = Matrix Reasoning Task. 
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Conversely, no differences were observed between male and female participants on the 
CRT-2 (M = 1.64, SD = 1.30 and M = 1.62, SD = 1.27, respectively), t(1034) = 0.25, p < .80, 
and the MRT (M = 1.43, SD = 0.97 and M = 1.44, SD = 1.01, respectively), 
t(1034) = 0.24, p = .81. 
Furthermore, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA found significant differences 
between participants’ scores (percentage correct) across the three IPMs, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .73, F(2, 1035) = 196.26, p < .001, ηp
2 = .28. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons indicated significantly higher scores on the MRT than both the CRT (p < .001, d 
= 0.66) and CRT-2 (p < .001, d = 0.22), and significantly higher scores on the CRT-2 than the 
CRT (p < .001, d = 0.46). There were also significant differences found by a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA between participants’ task difficulty ratings across the IPMs, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .50, F(2, 1035) = 521.50, p < .001, ηp
2 = .50. Despite attaining higher 
scores on the MRT, participants rated the MRT as significantly more difficult to complete 
than both the CRT (p < .001, d = 0.61) and CRT-2 (p < .001, d = 1.12). The CRT was also 
rated as significantly more difficult than the CRT-2 (p < .001, d = 0.45). 
 Effects of Systematic Processing 
To calculate SDT measures, Link Safety Rating was recoded into a binary variable 
(Email Judgement). Ratings of 4 (agree) and 5 (strongly agree) were classified as ‘correct’ 
for genuine emails and ‘incorrect’ for phishing emails. Ratings of 1 (strongly disagree) and 2 
(disagree) were classified as ‘incorrect’ for genuine emails and ‘correct’ for phishing emails. 
Ratings of 3 (unsure) were classified as incorrect for both email types.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for Email Judgement and SDT measures by 
condition. When calculated for all emails, Email Judgement scores have a minimum of 0 and 
a maximum of 14. The scores for A’ and B” across the sample indicate poor discrimination 
between phishing and genuine emails and a bias towards phishing decisions.  
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 Email Judgement Signal Detection Theory 
 All emails Genuine Phishing A’ B” 
Condition M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
CRT           
High 7.00 2.63 2.57 2.33 4.43 2.49 .49 .30 -.25 .67 
Low 6.18 2.47 2.49 2.17 3.69 2.43 .40 .27 -.13 .60 
CRT-2           
High 6.65 2.43 2.66 2.22 3.99 2.38 .44 .27 -.12 .64 
Low 5.98 2.23 2.85 2.16 3.13 2.42 .37 .25 -.10 .65 
MRT           
High 6.95 2.50 2.51 2.22 4.44 2.33 .48 .28 -.21 .58 
Low 5.99 1.97 2.47 2.15 3.52 2.32 .37 .22 -.07 .55 
Control 5.95 2.32 2.39 2.18 3.57 2.43 .37 .25 -.13 .64 
 
Table 3  
Email Judgement and Signal Detection Theory descriptive statistics. 
Note. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test; MRT = Matrix Reasoning Task. The n descriptive statistics for the Email Judgement variables are as 
presented in Table 2. The n descriptive statistics for Signal Detection Theory (SDT) measures are different due to error scores (136 error scores 
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In line with Kumaraguru et al. (2007), participants who completed an IPM and scored 
0 or 1 were categorised as ‘low’ (n = 464), whereas participants who attained a score greater 
than 1 were categorised as ‘high’ (n = 315). In this way, only those participants who had 
repeatedly used systematic processing during the IPM were categorised as high (see Table 3 
for Email Judgement and SDT descrptive statistics by IPM performance). 
 Effect on Discrimination 
A one-way, between subjects ANOVA was used to determine whether A’ scores 
differed across each condition and whether participants attained a low or high score. Since 
the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met, the Welch’s adjusted value was 
used. This analysis was significant F(6, 276.81) = 2.32, p = .03, η2 = .016. Figure 2 shows the 
effect of condition (CRT, CRT-2, MRT or Control) and IPM performance (high or low) on 
A’. Planned comparisons were then conducted to examine the differences between groups. A 
Bonferroni adjustment was applied to the alpha level used to determine statistical 
significance. The conventional alpha level of .05 was divided by three to produce a new alpha 
level of .017. The results indicated that participants who completed an IPM and attained a 
high score (M = 0.47, SD = 0.28) had significantly better discrimination performance 
compared to participants who attained a low score (M = 0.38, SD = 0.25), 
F(1, 271.68) = 17.36, p < .001, d = 0.34, and participants who did not complete an IPM (i.e., 
the Control condition), F(1, 326.91) = 17.90, p < .001, d = 0.23. Although the effect sizes for 
the ANOVA and planned comparisons are small, as shown in Table 2, the mean difference 
between the Control condition and the CRT High group was .12. The small effect sizes could 
be explained by the large variation in A’ scores within each of the groups (see Table 2). There 
was no difference between participants who attained a low score and participants who did not 
complete an IPM, F(1, 462.98) = 0.37, p = .52.  




Figure 2. A’ scores according to condition (CRT, CRT-2, MRT or Control) and information 
processing manipulation (IPM) score (low or high). 
 
Pearson’s correlation analyses were conducted to determine whether participants’ 
judgements during the Email Task were manipulated by attaining a high score on the IPM, 
and to compare the CRT, CRT-2 and MRT as manipulations of information processing. If, 
for example, the correlation between CRT scores and A’ scores is larger for the 
CRT condition than the Control condition, then this would indicate that participants’ 
discrimination performance was improved by attaining higher CRT scores prior to the Email 
Task. As shown in Table 4, only the MRT condition has a stronger correlation between IPM 
score and A’ than the Control condition.  
 Effect on Bias 
A one-way, between subjects ANOVA was used to determine whether B” scores 
differed across each condition and whether participants attained a low or high score. This 
analysis was non-significant, F(6, 881) = .78, p = .59. Therefore, there was no effect of IPM 
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 Pearson’s r correlation with A’ 
IPM IPM conditionsa Control condition 
CRT .14*  .23** 
CRT-2 .17** .25** 
MRT .19** .14*  
 
Table 4 
Correlation between information processing manipulation scores and A’. 
Note. IPM = information processing manipulation; CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test; 
MRT = matrix reasoning task. 
aThe correlation reported is respective to condition, e.g., the correlation between CRT 
performance and A’ is reported only for the CRT condition. 
*p < .05. **p < .001 
 
4. Discussion 
The present study investigated the effects of systematic processing on phishing 
susceptibility. Participants either completed one of three IPMs or did not complete an IPM 
before responding to email stimuli. Their scores (low or high) on these IPMs were then used 
as an indication of their information processing strategy (heuristic vs. systematic) when 
responding to email stimuli. 
The first aim of the study was to determine the effect of systematic processing on 
users’ ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. Consistent with previous 
research (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Parsons, McCormac, 
Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2013; Welk et al., 2015), participants who completed an 
IPM and attained a high score were better able to discriminate between phishing and genuine 
emails. Although the effect sizes of this analysis were small, this can be explained by the 
large variation within each of the groups. This variation was potentially caused by individual 
differences in information processing (Hamilton, Shih, & Mohammed, 2016; Cacioppo & 
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Petty, 1982). Furthermore, discrimination was only found to be improved by attaining higher 
scores on the MRT, where the correlation between MRT performance and discrimination 
performance was higher for the MRT condition than the Control condition. Unexpectedly, the 
correlation between IPM performance and discrimination performance was higher for the 
Control condition than the CRT and CRT-2 conditions. 
There are several potential explanations for these inconsistent findings between the 
three IPMs. First, the difference in characteristics between the MRT and the CRT and CRT-2 
may have interacted with individual differences in information processing. It is possible that 
participants who had a relatively strong preference for systematic processing were less likely 
to be affected by the manipulation; whether or not they completed the IPM before the Email 
Task, they may have been more likely to process the email stimuli systematically. Similarly, 
participants who had a relatively strong preference for heuristic processing were perhaps less 
likely to answer the IPM problems correctly and more likely to process the email stimuli 
heuristically. However, for those individuals who have no strong preference for either of the 
information processing strategies, it is possible that the CRT and CRT-2 were more likely to 
encourage the use of heuristic processing, whereas the MRT was more likely to activate 
systematic processing. This could be because, unlike the MRT, both the CRT and CRT-2 are 
designed to immediately invoke a heuristic response. While heuristic processing is our 
default information processing strategy (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), a heuristic answer is not 
necessarily immediately available when responding to the MRT. It is perhaps far more 
obvious than the CRT and CRT-2 that systematic processing is required to solve the MRT 
problems correctly. This could explain why only the MRT was found to activate systematic 
processing, and is supported by the findings that the MRT was significantly more likely to be 
solved correctly whilst also being perceived as more difficult to complete.  
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Second, participants’ performance on the IPMs used in the study may not be a reliable 
indication of their information processing strategies. The fact that an individual answered an 
IPM problem incorrectly does not necessarily mean that they weren’t using systematic 
processing to arrive at their answer. In addition to systematic processing, all three IPMs 
require respondents to rely on some form of reasoning ability. Hence, individual differences 
in participants’ reasoning ability may have distorted the data and produced the inconsistent 
findings.  
Third, the Email Task itself may have acted as a manipulation of information 
processing strategy. Several authors in the literature have indicated that, when processing 
information online, users are more reliant on heuristic processing as a way of managing the 
high cognitive load associated with this context (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2005; Guadagno, 
Muscanell, Rice, & Roberts, 2013; Metzger, Flanagin, & Medders, 2010; Muscanell, 
Guadagno, & Murphy, 2014). Furthermore, a neuroimaging study by Neupane, Saxena, 
Kuruvilla, Georgescu, and Kana (2014) observed participants expending “considerable 
effort” (p. 13) whilst attempting to detect phishing. In the current study, the cognitive 
demands of the Email Task may have caused participants to become more reliant on heuristic 
processing. This was perhaps especially the case for participants in the Control condition who 
had no opportunity to activate systematic processing prior to the Email Task. This would 
explain the unexpected higher correlations observed between performance on the IPMs and 
discrimination performance in the Control condition. It is also supported by the observation 
that the Control condition’s scores on all three IPMs were slightly, albeit non-significantly, 
lower than the IPM scores of the other conditions.   
All of these potential explanations should be investigated by future research. In 
particular, researchers should seek to manipulate information processing strategy in a way 
that does not depend on participants’ performance on the IPM (i.e., participants’ 
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categorisation as ‘systematic’ vs. ‘heuristic’ should only depend on their assignment to a 
condition). An example of such an IPM could be the use of a difficult-to-read font, as 
opposed to an easy-to-read font. Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre (2007) demonstrated 
that presenting the CRT in a difficult-to-read font significantly improves individuals’ CRT 
performance. Researchers should also measure and control for individual differences in 
information processing. Two measures that could potentially be used in future studies are 
Hamilton, Shih, and Mohammed’s (2016) Decision Styles Scale and Cacioppo and Petty’s 
(1982) Need for Cognition scale. 
With regards to the second aim of the study, the results indicated there was no effect 
of systematic processing on users’ bias towards judging an email as either ‘phishing’ or 
‘genuine’. This is consistent with findings by Parsons et al. (2013) where priming participants 
with the notion of phishing was only found to only improve their discrimination performance, 
and not affect their bias. Parsons et al.’s (2013) interpretation of this priming effect is 
applicable to the present study. Rather than causing participants to be more suspicious of the 
emails and hence more biased towards ‘phishing’ judgements, participants were speculated to 
have engaged in more diligent decision-making, thus improving their discrimination 
performance.  
The third aim of the study was to compare the CRT, CRT-2 and MRT as 
manipulations of information processing strategy in the context of email judgement. As 
discussed above, the MRT was the only IPM found to activate systematic processing during 
the Email Task. In addition, the MRT was more likely to be solved correctly whilst also being 
perceived as more difficult to complete. Altogether, these findings suggest that the MRT is a 
more effective manipulation of information processing than CRT and CRT-2 in the context of 
email judgement. Two advantages of an MRT over the CRT and CRT-2 are that it is easy to 
generate new problems that individuals have never been exposed to before and the task itself 
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is less culturally biased. In addition, the finding that the CRT is the only IPM to have gender 
differences is consistent with Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016). Consequently, an MRT 
should be preferred over the CRT and CRT-2 by phishing researchers in future studies that 
seek to manipulate information processing, and the CRT-2 should be preferred over the CRT 
as a measure of cognitive impulsivity. 
In summary, the findings of the study are consistent with the body of literature that 
suggests reliance on predominantly heuristic (rather than systematic) information processing 
strategies when managing emails is a key contributor to users’ susceptibility. Furthermore, 
these results suggest that increasing users’ reliance on systematic processing when managing 
emails can reduce their phishing susceptibility to some extent. The outcomes of this research 
have implications for cyber security training. Rather than merely warning users about the 
threat posed by phishing or even providing instructions for recognising the attacks, users 
could be trained to activate systematic processing as an effective strategy for defending 
against the threat of phishing. This could be achieved by requiring users to solve new matrix 
reasoning problems prior to being allowed to access their email accounts. Future research 
should seek to examine the effects of completing a MRT in a research setting that is more 
representative of email management in the real-world. 
 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations associated with this study. First, as mentioned 
above, the study did not directly measure the information processing strategies used during 
the Email Task. Once again, it is suggested that future studies incorporate a measure of 
individual differences in information processing so as to more reliably investigate the effects 
on phishing susceptibility.  
Second, despite the theoretical relationship between the use of social influence in 
phishing emails and users’ information processing strategy, the study did not investigate the 
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effectiveness of systematic processing against different social influence techniques (Cialdini, 
2009). For example, systematic processing activation may have a strong effect on users’ 
susceptibility to the scarcity technique, but little or no effect on their susceptibility to the 
authority technique. This possibility is consistent with studies that show certain social 
influence techniques in phishing emails are more effective than others (Butavicius, Parsons, 
Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015; Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, & Marett, 2014). 
Therefore, the relative effectiveness of systematic processing against each of Cialdini’s 
(2009) six social influence techniques should also be explored by future studies.  
Third, the study did not measure actual phishing susceptibility. Participants were not 
required to click on any of the links or provide personal information, and it is therefore 
possible that, in a real-world situation, participants may have become suspicious before 
responding to any of the phishing emails. Given that research has found strong email habits 
increase phishing susceptibility (Vishwanath, 2015; Vishwanath, Harrison, & Ng, 2016), it 
also possible that participants may have been less susceptible in the present study because 
they could not respond habitually, such as automatically clicking on links. Similarly, 
participants were responding to emails that were received by the inbox of a fictitious person, 
rather than their own personal inboxes. Participants may respond differently to actual emails 
received by their personal inboxes compared to the present study. 
Furthermore, participants’ email judgements were characterised by poor 
discrimination and a bias towards phishing decisions. This might reflect a lack of engagement 
with the role-play, so that participants’ responses were influenced by judgements of personal 
relevance. A solution to this might be to provide participants with more contextual 
information, such as a list of the fictitious person’s online accounts. A second explanation is 
that participants’ judgements were influenced by the lack of personalisation in all emails 
(emails contained generic greetings or no greetings). This is consistent with research that 
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shows personalisation is both an effective cue for detecting phishing and a cue relied upon by 
users (Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2015). Hence, the effects of 
systematic processing should be explored using phishing and genuine emails that contain 
personalised greetings, as is the case in some spear-phishing emails (Butavicius, Parsons, 
Pattinson, & McCormac, 2015). A third explanation is that participants became biased 
towards ‘phishing’ decisions due to the high proportion of phishing emails used in the present 
study compared to the proportion encountered in the real-world. A solution to this might be to 
incorporate a larger proportion of genuine emails in future research. Eliminating these 
potential causes of poor discrimination and bias in future studies may result in a larger effect 
of systematic processing on the ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. 
By seeking to address the limitations outlined above, future studies can more 
accurately determine the effects of systematic processing activation on phishing 
susceptibility. 
 Conclusions 
Exposure to phishing attacks is a possibility for almost all email users. For this reason, 
researchers must seek to understand why users fall victim to phishing attacks and, in turn, 
how to reduce susceptibility to phishing. The findings of the present study suggest that 
increasing users’ reliance on systematic processing when managing emails can reduce their 
phishing susceptibility. Matrix reasoning problems in particular were found to affect users’ 
judgements of the legitimacy of emails, such that correctly solving these problems improved 
their ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. This effect is ascribed to 
the activation of systematic processing.  
 These findings have implications for cyber security training. It suggests users could 
be trained to activate systematic processing as an effective strategy for defending against the 
threat of phishing. Future research should seek to address the limitations of the current study 
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in order to more accurately determine the effects of systematic processing activation on 
phishing susceptibility.  
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Figure 1. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).








Figure 2. The CRT-2.















Figure 4. Measure of task difficulty. 
 
 
